BYU Law Review
Volume 2017 | Issue 3

Article 6

May 2017

Chevron’s Pure Questions: Searching for Meaning
in Ambiguity
Neal A. Hoopes

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons
Recommended Citation
Neal A. Hoopes, Chevron’s Pure Questions: Searching for Meaning in Ambiguity, 2017 BYU L. Rev. 663 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2017/iss3/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

3.Hoopes.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete)

1/10/2018 4:01 PM

Chevron’s Pure Questions:
Searching for Meaning in Ambiguity
The danger of Chevron is that it invites courts to ignore
the fact that Congress decided some things because it did
not decide everything.
—Michael Herz 1
Since implied congressional intent is the basis for the Chevron
doctrine, courts cannot simply presume that Congress intends all
unclear statutes to signal deference to agencies. Instead, courts must
make some inquiry into whether that rationale remains true under the
particular circumstances. This Note contends, then, that the Chevron
framework, from the outset, asks the wrong question. Instead of
inquiring whether the statute is clear, courts should determine whether
Congress intended courts to defer to an agency on the question of
statutory interpretation. Instinctively deferring to an agency in the face
of every ambiguity undermines congressional intent. While implied
congressional intent is difficult to definitively ascertain in any
particular circumstance, courts should nonetheless determine whether
the question is one on which Congress is likely to wish courts to defer. The
Note continues that, in attempting to approximate congressional intent
regarding deference, the Chevron doctrine could significantly
improve how effectively the doctrine shadows congressional intent by
distinguishing between two types of statutory uncertainty, vagueness
and ambiguity, two concepts courts have thus far conflated. When a
court is faced with a lexical or syntactic ambiguity, the court should not
defer to the agency. Courts should embrace their responsibility as experts
in interpreting the law because when a provision is ambiguous rather
than vague, Congress would prefer courts to follow the best reading
of the words it enacted rather than following an agency’s
permissible construction.

1. Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking
Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 220 (1992).
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron v. Natural
Resource Defense Council, a bedrock principle in administrative law
has been that courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 2 This deference doctrine has
enormous consequences for the administrative state because courts
decide whether Chevron applies to a particular case, and, if deference
is due, the agency wins a significant amount of the time. 3 A recent
2. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2017) (“[A]gencies won significantly more in the circuit courts when Chevron
deference applied, at least when the court expressly considered whether to apply Chevron.
Indeed, there was nearly a twenty-five percentage-point difference in agency-win rates with
Chevron deference (77.4%) than without (53.6%).”). Significantly, while Chevron deference is
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study shows that agencies prevail in 77.4% of cases in which
the court applies Chevron, compared to 38.5% of cases in
which the court reviews the agency’s interpretation de novo. 4 This
strongly suggests that whether Chevron applies to a particular agency
interpretation is one of the most decisive aspects of a court’s
determination when an agency’s statutory construction is at issue.
Considering that the Chevron determination acts as the
dispositive issue in many cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has a charge
to ensure the doctrine proves well founded. The Court has rested
the deference doctrine on legislative intent—the assumption that
Congress intends to delegate primary interpretive authority to
agencies when it leaves an aspect of the statute ambiguous.
Accordingly, if congressional intent forms Chevron’s basis, the
Supreme Court should ensure the doctrine truly approximates when
Congress intends agencies to be the all-but-final arbiter.
Given the significance of the Chevron determination and the
reality that administrative agencies leverage Chevron when
interpreting statutory texts, the proper application (and even
legitimacy) of the doctrine prompts strong feelings. 5 Scholars
continually debate whether courts should continue to defer to
agencies in this manner. One side argues that statutes delegating
authority to federal agencies “are different from the rest” and
agencies’ statutory constructions deserve deference. 6 These scholars
contend that courts interpreting regulatory statutes in the same way
sporadically applied in the Supreme Court, the doctrine in the circuit courts is different.
Professors Barnett and Walker show that circuit courts apply the doctrine more often than the
Supreme Court and uphold agency action under de novo review only 38.5% of the time rather
than the Supreme Court’s 66.0%. Id.; cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1124–25 (2008).
4. Barnett & Walker, supra note 3.
5. As one scholar has put it, Chevron has been debated so extensively that,
“[a]lthough the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. is nearly eighteen years old—an age at which most humans are reaching
adulthood and most judicial doctrines are becoming settled—Chevron is in the throes of a
prolonged, difficult, and confused adolescence.” Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has No
Clothes: Christensen, Mead and Dual Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 173
(2002) (footnote omitted).
6. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 550 (2009)
[hereinafter Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake] (arguing that Chevron needs reform but deference
to administrative agencies is proper).
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they do other statutes would be tantamount to creating federal
common law. Alternatively, critics of Chevron quote Chief Justice
Marshall’s admonition that “[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 7 Separationof-powers concerns arise when courts abnegate their interpretive
responsibility, allowing agencies to interpret and enforce statutes
with only inconsequential judicial oversight. 8
Both sides correctly identify the issues, but each overstates its
case. Under certain circumstances, a court purporting to interpret an
unclear statute would be doing little more than picking the best
policy and dressing it up as statutory interpretation. But there are
other cases in which a court should not defer even though the
current Chevron doctrine demands deference. In circumstances in
which a court can interpret a statutory text in an objective manner,
the court is in the best position to act as the primary interpreter of
the text. This aspect of the Note, at least, is not novel—though it is
controversial and not well settled.
For instance, since the Chevron opinion in 1984, the Court has
cut back on the number of situations in which Chevron applies,
concluding that Congress cannot possibly intend agencies to resolve
all ambiguities. In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court found that
Chevron deference attaches only “when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law” (i.e., when the agency used sufficiently formal

7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see, e.g., Weaver, supra
note 5, at 180 (explaining the common critique that “Marbury and the APA are important
because they recognize that our governmental system involves checks and balances, and part of
that ‘checking’ function involves judicial review of administrative interpretations”).
8. Then-Judge Gorsuch succinctly and persuasively explained the common separation
of powers problems inherent in the Chevron Doctrine:
What would happen, for example, if the political majorities who run the legislative
and executive branches could decide cases and controversies over past facts? They
might be tempted to bend existing laws, to reinterpret and apply them retroactively
in novel ways and without advance notice. Effectively leaving parties who cannot
alter their past conduct to the mercy of majoritarian politics and risking the
possibility that unpopular groups might be singled out for this sort of
mistreatment—and raising along the way, too, grave due process (fair notice) and
equal protection problems.
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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procedures to warrant deference). 9 In another line of cases, the
Court has held that Congress cannot have intended agencies to
decide a question of “deep economic and political significance that is
central to th[e] statutory scheme.” 10 Given these exceptions, might
there be additional circumstances currently covered by Chevron in
which Congress does not intend to grant primary interpretive
authority to an agency?
The Mead opinion took a critical step forward in acknowledging
that Congress does not always intend courts to defer to agencies.
And the Court pivoted the analysis, at least initially, to whether there
is evidence that Congress indeed intended deference. The opinion
does not go far enough, however, because if an agency can clear the
procedural hurdle, then the Court applies Chevron as usual. 11 Yet
there are cases where the statute is genuinely ambiguous—meaning
that more than one plausible interpretation exists—but where
Congress likely meant for only one of those meanings to operate. In
other words, there are statutes that have one correct interpretation.
The Supreme Court encountered just such a situation only a few
years after issuing the Chevron opinion. 12 In Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court grappled with
the interpretation of two provisions allowing refugees to seek asylum
in the United States. 13 Although the textual language was unclear,
Justice Stevens, also the author of Chevron, refused to defer to the
9. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 230 (2001) (contending that
Congress only intends administrative deference when agencies promulgate regulations with the
effect of law, and “[i]t is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative
action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure
tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of
such force”).
10. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L.
REV. 19, 20 (2010) (“In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court and various courts of
appeals have declined to afford deference to agency interpretations when an agency’s proposed
interpretation relies on an insufficiently definite statutory provision in order to greatly increase
the agency’s power—even in situations that would seem to suggest statutory ambiguity and
would thus warrant Chevron deference.”).
11. Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 563 (contending that “[b]ecause
Mead gives way to Chevron in routine cases, it does not go far enough to alter the standard
search for statutory meaning”).
12. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
13. Id.
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agency’s interpretation because the question was “a pure question of
statutory construction for the courts to decide.” 14 According to the
majority, Cardoza-Fonseca was an instance in which Congress
intended one specific answer, and thus the Court impliedly
created an exception to Chevron for “pure question[s] of
statutory construction.” 15
Justice Scalia wrote an animated concurrence, contending that
Chevron deference applied. 16 Justice Scalia lost the battle, but he
ultimately won the war: the Supreme Court’s burgeoning exception
to Chevron died before it could fully develop. 17 One probable reason
why the “pure questions” doctrine never took hold is that the Court
never “define[d] precisely what a ‘pure question’ is.” 18
While I do not presume to know exactly what Justice Stevens
had in mind when he authored Cardoza-Fonseca, 19 this Note
attempts to lay out a method by which courts can determine if the
statutory provision has a specific meaning and determine if Congress
likely intended a court to defer. The Note attempts to clarify the
“pure questions” exception to Chevron by illustrating and defending
two closely related circumstances when courts should not defer to an
agency because the issue is one of pure statutory interpretation.
Courts should distinguish between different types of textual
uncertainty because not all unclear statutes suffer from the same
malady. Specifically, courts should not defer when confronted with
an issue of lexical or syntactic ambiguity. Courts should hesitate
before deferring in the face of lexical or syntactic ambiguity because,
though the statute may be unclear and the answer difficult to
determine, the linguistic properties of the words indicate that
Congress likely had one meaning in mind. Alternatively, courts
ought to defer when the statute is vague—when attempting to
14. Id. at 446.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 453–55 (Scalia, J., concurring).
17. See Herz, supra note 1, at 222.
18. Id.
19. Indeed, my proposed examples of pure questions of statutory interpretation differ
greatly from the question presented in Cardoza-Fonseca. Justice Stevens likely thought of the
exception as one in which congressional intent signaled that only one answer was possible
while my proposed exception relies on textual clues to determine whether only one answer
is possible.

668

3.Hoopes.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete)

663

1/10/2018 4:01 PM

Chevron’s Pure Questions

“interpret” the statute amounts to no more than the creation of
federal common law.
The first instance of pure statutory construction occurs when a
court confronts lexical ambiguity. Lexical ambiguity arises when it is
unclear which of two or more meanings applies to the situation. 20 An
often-used example is the word bank, 21 which has two noticeably
distinct senses: one referring to a financial institution and the other
referring to a riverbank. 22 When a person says, “I’m headed to the
bank,” the phrase could lead to two completely different
understandings depending on if the individual has a paddle or a
cashier’s check in hand.
A more conceptually difficult example is the multi-sense meaning
of door. 23 Used one way the word refers to a physical object, usually
wooden and rectangular, that a person can knock on or open.
Another way English speakers use door refers to the space between
the doorframe where people or objects may move. 24 We occasionally
use doorway to refer to this second meaning. When a person says,
“Guess who just knocked on the door?” or “Guess who just walked
through the door?” that person is actually expressing two distinct
senses of the same word. But, as used in these two example
questions, people rarely recognize the distinction. This, therefore, is
an example of a possible lexical ambiguity in which the distinction
between the senses is finely grained 25 and is the type of statutory
20. Justice Scalia defines this as “[a]n uncertainty of meaning based not on the scope of
a word or phrase but on a semantic dichotomy that gives rise to any of two or more quite
different but almost equally plausible interpretations.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 425 (2012); cf. VICTORIA FROMKIN
ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 550 (8th ed. 2007) (defining lexical ambiguity as
“[m]ultiple meanings of sentences due to words that have multiple meanings”).
21. See, e.g., Brendan S. Gillon, Ambiguity, Generality, and Indeterminacy: Tests and
Definitions, 85 SYNTHESE 391, 404 (1990); ADAM SENNET, AMBIGUITY, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2016 ed.), https://plato.stan
ford. edu/archives/spr2016/entries/ambiguity/.
22. See Gillon, supra note 21, at 404 (noting that “the lexical ambiguity of words such
as ‘bank’ cannot be ignored”).
23. JEAN AITCHISON, WORDS IN THE MIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MENTAL
LEXICON 175 (Wiley-Blackwell, 4th ed. 2012) (1987).
24. Id. (noting that “[t]his has been called complementary ambiguity, since door refers
to different aspects of the same object”).
25. Id. Professor Aitchison explains that words “multiply, like ever-splitting amoebas, as
new meanings creep in alongside older ones. ‘Meanings expand their range
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question that might come before a court. The word has two distinct
meanings, but those meanings are so closely related that they
are often conflated—though only one sense operates in any
given context.
The second instance of pure statutory construction involves
syntactic (or structural) ambiguity. This type of ambiguity arises
when the structure of the sentence creates uncertainty regarding its
meaning, leading to questions about the relationship between
particular words or clauses. 26 One example of syntactic ambiguity is
found in the sentence, “The boy saw the man with a telescope.” 27 It
is unclear from the sentence structure alone whether the boy or the
man held the telescope. 28 The structure of the sentence calls into
question the relationship between the clauses and creates uncertainty
in the overall interpretation. 29
Lexical and syntactic ambiguity are distinct from and should be
contrasted with vagueness, with vague provisions receiving
administrative deference. The most well-known example of
vagueness comes from H.L.A. Hart’s hypothetical statute that
prohibits taking “a vehicle into the public park.” 30 Professor Hart
inquired whether the statute should be interpreted to include
bicycles, toy automobiles, or airplanes. 31 The question is not which
of the two meanings of vehicles applies in this circumstance; rather,
the issue is whether a particular object falls within the definition of
“vehicle.” 32 In other words, this hypothetical would require the
court to determine the core characteristics of a vehicle, as the word is
through the development of various polysemies . . . these polysemies may be regarded as
quite fine-grained.’” Id. (quoting PAUL J. HOPPER & ELIZABETH C. TRAUGOTT,
GRAMMATICALIZATION 100 (1993)).
26. FROMKIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 561. “Structural ambiguity: The phenomenon in
which the same sequence of words has two or more meanings that is accounted for by different
phrase structure analysis.” Id.
27. See id. at 176–77.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1958).
31. Id. Professor Hart remarks that “[p]lainly this forbids an automobile, but what
about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these, as we say, to be
called ‘vehicles’ for the purpose of the rule or not?” Id.
32. Id.
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used in the statute, and to determine whether a particular object
shares enough of those characteristics to be considered a vehicle.
These types of decisions should receive administrative deference
because determining, for instance, whether “vehicle” includes a
stationary World War II memorial with a military truck set on a
pedestal 33 has an air of policymaking.
While this Note’s narrow objective is to specifically identify
lexical and syntactic ambiguity as examples of pure questions, more
broadly the Note attempts to demonstrate that Chevron step one
asks the wrong question. Instead of inquiring whether the statute is
clear, courts should ask whether the text suggests that Congress
intended the provision to have a specific meaning. When courts
inquire only into whether the statute is clear, they ignore the fact
that many statutory provisions have actual meaning but, for whatever
reason—likely that the members of Congress did not catch the
ambiguity—the provision is susceptible to multiple interpretations.
To instinctively defer to an agency in the face of every ambiguity
undermines congressional intent, the foundation upon which
Chevron sits. 34
This Note proceeds in three parts. After describing the Chevron
framework, Part I explains why the doctrine needs a broader
exception than provided for in Mead. Because Chevron bases its
legitimacy on implied congressional intent, the Court has created a
legal fiction both by holding that Congress intends courts to defer
whenever there is an unclear statute and by failing to make any
inquiry into whether Congress truly intends deference under the
circumstances. Part II lays out a method by which courts can more
closely shadow likely congressional intent regarding when courts
should defer to administrative agencies. It does so by distinguishing
between two types of statutory uncertainty—ambiguity and
vagueness. In Part III, the Note makes the case for why the
distinction between ambiguous and vague statutory provisions makes
33. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 663 (1958) (engaging in Professor Hart’s hypothetical by proposing a difficult
case, that of a military truck on a pedestal).
34. This assumes that Congress does not wish each and every unclear statutory
provision to signal administrative deference. This assumption is explored in detail in the
following Part.
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sense; specifically, neither the congressional-intent theory nor
alternative theories such as agency expertise or political
accountability justify deferring to administrative agencies when the
statutory provision is lexically or syntactically ambiguous.
I. WHY AN EXCEPTION TO THE CHEVRON FRAMEWORK
IS NECESSARY
The Chevron analytical framework is fairly straightforward, even
if courts often struggle to apply it consistently. 35 Chevron’s
theoretical foundation, however, is less apparent. Scholars have
struggled to come to a consensus regarding the judiciary’s basis for
administrative deference, and many scholars have labeled the
prevailing rationale—implied congressional intent—a legal fiction.36
Indeed, accepting the rationale of implied congressional intent,
which the Court did in Mead, creates problems for Chevron’s
coherency since Congress does not intend courts to defer in every
instance. The Court came close to recognizing this incoherency in
Mead. And its future decisions should more broadly consider
whether Congress actually intends to delegate to agencies primary
interpretive authority with every unclear statutory provision.
This Part addresses why, for the Chevron doctrine to prove
coherent, it is necessary for courts to ask the broader question of
when Congress genuinely intends for agencies to resolve ambiguities
and then for courts to formulate exceptions to administrative
deference that would help courts to defer only in those
circumstances. This Part argues that courts should acknowledge that
Chevron is based on a legal fiction, that courts should defer to
agencies only under circumstances that reflect when Congress
actually intends deference, and, thus, that a broader exception than
Mead is necessary.

35. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 3, at 1124–25 (showing that the Supreme Court
applies Chevron only a quarter of the time where it would seem to apply).
36. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203 (2001) (labeling the conclusions drawn about congressional intent
“fraudulent”); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1285 (2008);
Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 311 (2011) (noting
that the Chevron fiction is “unsupportable”).
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A. Current Chevron Doctrine
The Chevron decision significantly altered administrative law, but
in 1984 there was no hint that the case would become a landmark
decision. 37 Only six Justices participated in the case and none
dissented. 38 Additionally, in the year following the Chevron decision,
the Court decided nineteen cases in which the Chevron framework
should have applied. Yet the Court cited the opinion only once. 39 As
one scholar has remarked, “Justice Stevens’ opinion contained
several features that can only be described as ‘revolutionary,’ even if
no revolution was intended at the time.” 40 Although it is difficult to
pinpoint exactly when Chevron achieved canonical status, it first
gained importance in the lower courts, and the Supreme Court cited
it rarely until Justice Antonin Scalia joined the Court in 1986. 41
The Chevron litigation arose out of the Reagan administration’s
deregulatory agenda. 42 The Clean Air Act mandates that states
establish a program to regulate “major stationary sources” of air
pollution, but the Act does not define the term. 43 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), reversing course, redefined
the term to refer to a permit owner’s entire facility rather than a
single polluting source. 44 This policy, known as the “bubble
concept,” 45 reduced the costs of complying with the EPA’s emissions
standards because, if a stationary source referred to an entire facility,

37. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
976 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Judicial Deference] (“In time . . . lower courts, agencies, and
commentators all came to regard the analysis of the deference question set forth in Chevron as
fundamentally different from that of the previous era. Justice Stevens’ opinion contained
several features that can only be described as ‘revolutionary’ . . . .”).
38. Id. at 975–76.
39. Id.
40. Id.; Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 284 (1986) (noting that “[t]his revolutionary effect is not apparent from a quick
examination of the opinion itself”).
41. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 838 (2001).
42. Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 37, at 975 (“[T]he disputed issue could be
seen as part of the general deregulatory thrust of the early Reagan Administration.”).
43. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841 (1984).
44. Id. at 862 (explaining that the EPA’s new interpretation of “stationary source”
proved a “sharp break with prior interpretations of the Act”).
45. Id. at 841–42.
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pollution could surge in parts of the facility as long as the increase
was offset by a decrease within the “bubble.”
The Chevron opinion upheld the EPA’s new definition because
“Congress did not actually have an intent regarding the applicability
of the bubble concept.” 46 The Court also devised a novel framework
under which courts should analyze similar questions. The Court held
that courts defer to an agency interpretation unless “the issue is
suitable for independent judicial resolution.” 47 Independent judicial
analysis had been the default rule, 48 but the Chevron Court reversed
the presumption in favor of deference, permitting independent
judgment only when the statute is unambiguous. The Court
appeared to jettison the factors courts traditionally relied upon to
determine whether the case warranted deference 49 and instituted a
procedural framework that, at least facially, is straightforward.
Traditionally, the Chevron analysis consists of two distinct steps.
The first step requires the court to determine “whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue” 50—whether the
statutory language is sufficiently clear that only one plausible
interpretation exists. If the court determines that the statute is
ambiguous, the court continues to step two. The second step
instructs the court to determine whether the agency’s interpretation
is “permissible”—giving broad discretion to the agency to interpret
the statute according to its understanding of congressional intent,
unless the agency’s interpretation moves into the realm
of unreasonableness. 51
A court’s responsibility is to determine if the statute is
unambiguous because, if so, congressional intent is clear. Chevron
expressly declares that “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give

46. Id. at 845.
47. Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 37, at 977.
48. Id.
49. For example, Justice Scalia argued that under Chevron, “there is no longer any
justification for giving ‘special’ deference to ‘long-standing and consistent’ agency
interpretations of law.” Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989).
50. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
51. See id. at 843.
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effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”52
Chevron step one is, thus, an all-or-nothing decision whereby the
court decides whether the statute is clear, 53 reasoning that if the
statute is unclear, Congress would wish the court to grant deference
to the agency’s interpretation of the specific statutory provision.
Courts generally determine whether the statute is ambiguous by
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction.” 54 The
Supreme Court has sanctioned the use of “the statute’s text, its
context, the structure of the statutory scheme, and canons of textual
construction” to determine whether a statute is clear at Chevron step
one. 55 The Court has also accepted evidence of “statutory purposes,
including those revealed in part by legislative and regulatory
history,” to make a similar determination. 56 If a court cannot deduce
the clear meaning of the statutory provision, it proceeds to Chevron
step two.
Step two ensures that a “court does not simply impose its own
construction on” an ambiguous statute, “as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation.” 57 The court’s
responsibility shifts from finding the best meaning to ensuring that
the agency’s interpretation is “permissible.” One scholar has
conceptualized the “permissible” meaning of the statute as a “space”
within which the agency may operate. 58 Unclear terms may have a
variety of permissible meanings, and the agency is authorized to

52. Id. at 842–43.
53. Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 37, at 977 (“Chevron transformed a regime
that allowed courts to give agencies deference along a sliding scale into a regime with an
on/off switch.”).
54. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
55. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 309 (2013).
56. Id. at 309–10; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
143–47 (2000).
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also id. at 844 (footnote omitted) (“We have long
recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference
to administrative interpretations . . . .”).
58. Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space”
and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012). Chevron grants to an agency an
“area within which [the] administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a
manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—that is, its [delegated or]
allocated authority.” Id.

675

3.Hoopes.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/10/2018 4:01 PM

2017

choose any meaning that is within this space, bounded only by the
reasonable confines of the disputed term. 59
The second step is more than perfunctory, as the court takes a
closer look than simply asking whether the interpretation “would
flunk the laugh test at the Kennedy School of Public Policy.” 60 Yet,
when a court reaches step two, it rarely overturns an agency
interpretation as impermissible. 61 Although courts do not simply
rubber-stamp any interpretation the agency concocts, the Chevron
opinion strongly suggests that courts are not “supervisors of
agencies” but are closer to “a check or bulwark against abuses of
agency power.” 62 Thus, if a statute is truly unclear, the court will give
significant deference to the agency’s interpretation and will second
guess the agency only when the court encounters an
untenable interpretation.
Thus, the Chevron framework, without proper exceptions, has
enormous consequence for statutes with lexical or syntactic
ambiguity because the provision might be difficult to decipher,
leading the court to declare the provision ambiguous. The court
would then switch from attempting to find the best meaning of the
provision to assuring itself that the agency’s interpretation is
reasonable. This creates issues for lexically and syntactically
ambiguous statutes because linguistically such statutes have only one
possible answer, but a court might be forced to accept a plausible yet
incorrect agency construction. 63

59. See id.
60. Erika Jones et al., Developments in Judicial Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of
Standing and Deference to the Agency, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 113, 124 (1990) (comments of the Hon.
Judge Stephen F. Williams) (remarking that the view of Chevron step two as merely an exercise
in determining whether the agency interpretation passes the laugh test is “a gross overreading
of Chevron”).
61. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 (1994).
62. Starr, supra note 40, at 300–01 (“Although the Court has not completely embraced
the pure checking and balancing paradigm as a normative description of the court-agency
relationship, and probably never will, Chevron strongly suggests that courts should see
themselves not as supervisors of agencies, but more as a check or bulwark against abuses of
agency power.”).
63. See infra Section III.B.
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B. Chevron’s Foundation
Any theory that purports to create an exception to Chevron must
square with the rationale behind the doctrine itself. If the exception
does not further the Chevron doctrine, either the exception is
unwarranted or the entire doctrine is amiss. Since this Note contends
that Chevron deference has its place, provided the appropriate
exceptions apply, the concept that courts should not defer in the face
of lexical or syntactic ambiguity must also conform to the Court’s
rationale for creating administrative deference in the first instance.
This task is not entirely straightforward, however. Scholars
debate what doctrine or principle grants the Court authority to
depart from Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition that the authority
falls to the judiciary “to say what the law is.” 64 For instance, most
scholars admit that the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) offers
no support for Chevron deference. 65 The APA specifies that “the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning
or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 66 Additionally, the
statute provides that “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . set aside agency
action . . . not in accordance with law.” 67
With no support from the APA, the Chevron opinion advanced
several non-statutory theories about the policy basis of administrative
deference. 68 First, Justice Stevens argued that Congress likely
intended to delegate certain questions to administrative agencies

64. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
65. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 788–94 (2010)
(explaining that the APA includes provisions that “seem to be relatively clear statements by
Congress intended to assign resolution of legal issues to reviewing courts, not to administrative
agencies”); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV.
113, 189–211 (1998) (arguing that “[t]he legislative history of the APA leaves no doubt that
Congress thought the . . . [statute] ‘require[d] courts to determine independently all relevant
questions of law, including the interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions’”); Cass
R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 196 (2006) (contending that the APA
“seems to suggest that ambiguities must be resolved by courts and hence that the Chevron
framework is wrong”).
66. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
67. Id.
68. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).

677

3.Hoopes.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/10/2018 4:01 PM

2017

because “the regulatory scheme is technical or complex” or because
“Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the
question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with
the scheme devised by the agency.” 69 Second, agencies have the
necessary expertise to decide difficult policy questions that courts
cannot since “[j]udges are not experts in the field.” 70 Third,
administrative agencies are more politically accountable than courts
and, thus, in the face of ambiguous statutory text, agencies ought to
be the institution establishing policy. The opinion reasoned that
“[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices.” 71
Beyond these theories, scholars have advanced other arguments
that have received varying degrees of acknowledgment from courts.
For instance, Peter Strauss contended that Chevron is the Court’s
method of ensuring national uniformity in federal administrative
law. 72 Because the Supreme Court may review only a small
percentage of circuit decisions, the Chevron doctrine allows for
greater national uniformity, counteracting “the balkanization of
federal law.” 73 By granting agencies broad deference, the Chevron
doctrine reduces the likelihood of circuit splits that could shroud the
administrative state in uncertainty. 74 Cass Sunstein has justified
deference by emphasizing the executive’s need to react “promptly
and decisively” in the face of change. 75 Professors Goldsmith and
Manning argue that agencies, being executive branch departments,
have independent constitutional authority to fill statutory gaps.76
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093
(1987) [hereinafter Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases]; see also id. at 1112 (“Varying
instructions from different courts of appeals not only interfere with the instruction to achieve
uniformity, but also make it more difficult for the agency to manage its own resources . . . .”).
73. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is,
115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2588 (2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond Marbury].
74. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases, supra note 72, at 1112.
75. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 73, at 2587.
76. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE
L.J. 2280, 2297–302 (2006).

678

3.Hoopes.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete)

663

1/10/2018 4:01 PM

Chevron’s Pure Questions

They urge that “the executive branch presumptively may fill in the
legislative details unless Congress specifies otherwise.” 77
Despite the proliferation of scholarly theories, the Supreme
Court has rested its recent decisions on implied congressional intent
as Chevron’s foundation. 78 In Mead, the Court made clear that
“administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision
qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency.” 79 Gone were the references to
agency expertise and greater democratic accountability, and absent
were any other scholarly theories about how the Chevron doctrine
may be defended on alternative grounds. 80
Joining the reasoning in Mead, scholars too have generally
endorsed implied congressional intent as the basis for Chevron.81
Two prominent scholars have remarked that the congressional-intent
theory proves the most persuasive because it “can solve the
puzzles about why Chevron deference is mandatory, and why it
supersedes the APA . . . . Deference is mandatory because Congress
has commanded it.” 82 Accordingly, implied congressional intent is
the only theory that seems to fully encompass Chevron’s reasoning.
Moreover, scholars have argued that the implied-intent theory
represents how Congress acts. Professor Bressman notes that
Congress absolutely intends to delegate interpretive authority, at
least under certain circumstances. 83 Her work attempts to rebut the
critics’ charge “that Congress does not think about delegation of

77. Id. at 2298.
78. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001).
79. Id. at 226; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132
(2000); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (noting that Chevron
depends on the “presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and
foremost, by the agency”).
80. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226.
81. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 73, at 2589 (“[A] consensus has developed
on an important proposition, one that now provides the foundation for Chevron itself: The
executive’s law-interpreting power turns on congressional will.”); see Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 41, at 863–73.
82. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 41, at 870.
83. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97
VA. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2011).
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interpretive authority at all or in the way the Court imagines.” 84 She
writes that an inquiry into how Congress behaves provides
legitimate reasons “to believe that the basic presumption of
congressional delegation is well grounded” and “to assume that an
express delegation of regulatory authority generally carries an
implied delegation of interpretive authority.” 85
Additional scholarship shows that Congress does intend to
delegate, at least for certain situations. Professors Epstein and
O’Halloran, for instance, found that Congress delegated more
policymaking when statutes were complex. 86 They argued that
Congress counts on 535 members and their staff to understand
policy concerns and to recommend potential legislative solutions,
whereas the executive branch “is filled (or can be filled) with policy
experts who can run tests and experiments, gather data, and
otherwise determine the wisest course of policy.” 87
Since the Supreme Court has generally relied on congressional
intent and has based its opinions on this theory, this Note assumes
that Chevron is based on the notion that Congress intends for
agencies to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions. Despite the
existence of alternative theories, the Court seems interested only in
congressional intent and is most likely amenable to restricting the
doctrine based on arguments that Congress does not intend all
ambiguities to license agencies to base their policies solely on
plausible readings of statutory provisions.
Yet, accepting that Chevron is based on implied congressional
intent also illustrates the necessity of creating exceptions to the
doctrine that permit courts to reject deference in instances where
Congress does not intend deference. For instance, not all
commentators are prepared to assume that Congress intends judicial
deference as Chevron commands. Some scholars contend that
justifying broad agency deference on an implied congressional intent

84. Id. at 2011.
85. Id.
86. David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the
Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 967 (1999).
87. Id.
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is more than a legal fiction—it is a farce. 88 Professors Barron and
Kagan contend that “[i]t is far more likely that Congress, unless
confronting a serious problem in the exercise of some interpretive
authority, simply fails to think about this allocation of power
between judges and agencies.” 89 Other critics argue that Congress
has never enacted a general deference statute, and as Professor
Merrill points out, Congress’s general “practice of enacting specific
delegations of interpretative authority suggests that Congress
understands that no such general authority exists.” 90 Professor Farina
also takes issue with implicit congressional intent as a justification for
deference because Congress uses similarly expansive language in
statutory schemes wholly “committed to judicial oversight,” and
this “would seem to undermine any notion of some generic
legislative disinclination to trust courts with interpreting broad
statutory mandates.” 91
Indeed, Judge Henry Edwards wrote that simply assuming “that
silence or ambiguity confers that kind of interpretative authority on
the agency is unacceptable, for it assumes the very point in issue and
thus ‘fails to distinguish between statutory ambiguities on the one
hand and legislative delegations of law-interpreting power to
agencies on the other.’” 92 Presuming that Congress implicitly
delegates interpretive authority to agencies without evidence of such
intent, indeed, with evidence to the contrary, does little to support
the Chevron doctrine.

88. See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 36, at 203 (labeling the conclusions drawn
about congressional intent “fraudulent”); Criddle, supra note 36, at 1285; Seidenfeld, supra
note 36, at 311 (noting that the Chevron fiction is “unsupportable”).
89. Barron & Kagan, supra note 36, at 216.
90. Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 37, at 995.
91. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 471 (1989). Professor Farina writes that “[t]he
classic example of a broad mandate committed to judicial elaboration and enforcement is the
Sherman Act’s prohibition of ‘[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade’ and of activities that ‘monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States.’” Id. at 471 n.77 (all but first alteration in original)
(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (1982)).
92. CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Clark M. Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of
Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 261 (1988)).
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Moreover, current scholarship also proves that Congress does
not always intend to grant agencies primary interpretive authority in
the face of ambiguity. Professors Gluck and Bressman recently
conducted a survey of 137 congressional drafters about doctrines of
statutory interpretation. 93 They conclude that “although ambiguity
sometimes signals intent to delegate, often it does not.” 94 Moreover,
these drafters were chiefly referring to purposeful ambiguity in
statutes, not to when “neither side realized the ambiguity that they
were creating.” 95 While an across-the-board presumption of
congressional intent to delegate this authority could potentially be
justified if Congress intended agencies to always act as the primary
interpreters, unintentional ambiguity is the least likely type of
ambiguity to have an attaching congressional intent. Thus, when the
ambiguity went unrecognized until an agency began promulgating
regulations, the fiction that Congress implied a delegated
interpretive authority proves the weakest. And, Gluck and
Bressman’s study demonstrates that legislative drafters believe
Congress does not always intend an agency’s interpretation to
predominate—even when Congress passes a statute with a
manifest ambiguity. 96
Thus, it speaks to reason that if there are circumstances in which
Congress does not intend courts to defer to administrative agencies,
courts should pay close attention to signals regarding when
deference is warranted. As such, courts should not merely determine
whether the statute is clear. Instead, they should inquire further and
develop doctrines that seek to determine when Congress intends
93. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901 (2013). Professors Gluck and Bressman surveyed 137 “congressional staffers drawn
from both parties, both chambers of Congress, and spanning multiple committees—on topics
ranging from their knowledge and use of the canons of interpretations, to legislative history,
the administrative law deference doctrines, the legislative process, and the courts-Congress
relationship.” Id. at 902.
94. Id. at 996.
95. Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative
Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 872 (2014) (“Avoidable unintentional ambiguity results
from a lack of attention to detail or a lack of time or resources to resolve ambiguity. One of the
most prominent examples of an avoidably, but unintentionally, vague statute is the Alien
Contract Labor Law that was the focus of the seminal Holy Trinity Supreme Court case.”).
96. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 996.
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deference and when the judiciary should wield its full reviewing
authority. The distinction advocated here is for courts to withhold
deference for pure questions of statutory construction—when the
disputed provision comprises a lexical or syntactic ambiguity.
C. Chevron’s Legal Fiction
A general scholarly consensus has developed, endorsed most
prominently by the Supreme Court in Mead, that “[t]he executive’s
law-interpreting power turns on congressional will.” 97 This has
certain implications for when courts should defer to administrative
agencies. As one scholar has remarked, “The conclusion that
Chevron rests on an implied delegation from Congress also has
important implications for Chevron’s domain: it means that Congress
has ultimate authority over the scope of the Chevron doctrine and
that courts should attend carefully to the signals Congress sends
about its interpretative wishes.” 98 Courts should defer to agency
interpretations of statutes only when Congress has expressly or
impliedly conveyed a desire for such a result.
Yet, any theory based on implied congressional intent is
necessarily based on a legal fiction. 99 This is so because of the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of determining in specific
circumstances when Congress expresses an “implied” desire to
delegate primary interpretive authority to agencies. As Professors

97. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 73, at 2589; see Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 41, at 863–73.
98. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 41, at 836. Professors Merrill and Hickman argue
that the Court has recognized to a certain degree that Chevron deference is not always
appropriate, and this is why the Court has retained Skidmore deference.
Recognizing Skidmore as the default alternative to Chevron gives courts three
choices rather than two in reviewing agency interpretations of statutes. Instead of
Chevron deference and no deference, we have Chevron deference, Skidmore
deference, and no deference. This larger menu of options allows Chevron to be
given a relatively narrow domain, one that hopefully captures those circumstances in
which deference is most appropriate.
Id. at 863.
99. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury, supra note 73, at 2590 (“But as Justices Breyer and
Scalia have independently emphasized, this is a legal fiction; usually the legislature has not
expressly conferred that power at all. The view that the executive may ‘say what the law is’
results not from any reading of statutory text, but from a heavily pragmatic construction, by
courts, of (nonexistent) congressional instructions.” (internal citations omitted)).
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Barron and Kagan insist, “Given the difficulty of determining actual
congressional intent, some version of constructive—or perhaps more
frankly said, fictional—intent must operate in judicial efforts to
delineate the scope of Chevron.” 100
The fact that Chevron, as it now stands, is built upon a type of
legal fiction is not its fatal flaw, however. The current doctrine’s
greatest weakness is that it proves more contradictory in nature than
a simple legal fiction. It fundamentally misrepresents the analysis
courts actually engage in when confronted with an agency action. If
the doctrine is genuinely based on congressional intent to delegate,
then courts should attempt to determine whether Congress actually
intended to delegate. Yet, these questions do not enter into the
Chevron analysis. 101 Chevron instructs courts to focus on whether the
text is clear and, if not, to presume congressional intent to delegate
regardless of any other factors. 102 As Professor Bressman notes,
Chevron recognizes that Congress may impliedly delegate
interpretive authority to agencies. “But rather than implementing
these insights as part of the doctrinal analysis, Chevron reverts to
the . . . search [for] meaning.” 103
Thus, Chevron correctly notes that Congress may at times intend
for agencies to authoritatively interpret its statutes, but the doctrine
does not take into account circumstances under which Congress
likely intends otherwise. It creates a legal fiction that every
ambiguous administrative provision gives the agency primary
interpretive authority. If ambiguous statutes do not always signal
congressional intent to defer—as this Note contends—courts should
give special attention to determining when Congress expects the
judiciary to perform a probing review of agency action.
Ultimately, Chevron’s legal fiction fails to accomplish its
purported aim—to approximate congressional intent. And to the
extent the doctrine does not shadow congressional intent, it is
disingenuous, “a kind of diversion, allowing judges to exercise
100. Barron & Kagan, supra note 36, at 203.
101. Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 553–54.
102. Id. at 553 (“Chevron recognizes such ‘delegating’ factors; its mistake is failing to
make those factors central to its doctrinal inquiry. The factors operate only as justifications for
agency delegation, not as guides for determining the existence of that delegation.”).
103. Id. at 553–54.
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significant discretion in determining statutory meaning while
attributing their discretionary choices to Congress.” 104
But not all implied congressional intent theories inevitably suffer
from a similar flaw. While congressional intent is difficult to
determine, especially implied intent, this does not necessarily suggest
that courts cannot create a legal fiction that more closely aligns with
congressional behavior and intent. Part of any such doctrine must
include courts’ assessing whether Congress intended administrative
deference under the specific circumstances. In other words, few
circumstances will present themselves in which courts can definitively
say that Congress disfavored deference under the specific statute, but
courts can provide rules that create exceptions to Chevron under
circumstances in which Congress is least likely to favor
administrative deference.
In this regard, Mead is a step in the right direction. While
Chevron partially bases its justification on congressional intent, an
examination of likely congressional intent is absent from the Court’s
analysis. Conversely, Mead makes legislative intent its central,
threshold inquiry. 105 Mead involved the issue of whether a United
States Customs Service ruling letter deserved Chevron deference. 106
U.S. Customs issues between 10,000 and 15,000 of these letters
annually from forty-six separate offices, and letters are issued and
modified without notice-and-comment procedures. 107 The Court
withheld Chevron deference, reasoning that “there [is] no indication
that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law.”108
Mead asserts that Congress does not intend to delegate interpretive
104. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 619 (2002) (“This raises significant
questions about institutional accountability for legislative law, for it allows judges to use the
soothing rhetoric of the standard judicial story to distance themselves from their own
interpretive creations.”).
105. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001) (“We have recognized a
very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional
authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”).
106. Id. at 221.
107. Id. at 223, 233 (“[A]ny suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law
are being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency’s 46 scattered offices is simply
self-refuting.”).
108. Id. at 221.
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authority to executive agencies unless the agency has engaged in
sufficiently formal procedures, “such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication.” 109
Though Mead makes its central inquiry whether Congress
actually intended to delegate, the case proves too little to correct
Chevron’s error. As Professor Bressman argues, “the Mead opinion
does not carry the procedural consideration through to its proper
conclusion.” 110 The opinion focuses on the procedure the agency
undertook to issue the rule, and if it passes the Mead inquiry, the
Court applies Chevron as usual without undertaking any inquiry into
other factors, such as whether Congress was likely to have intended
deference under the particular circumstances. 111 “Because Mead gives
way to Chevron in routine cases, it does not go far enough to alter
the standard search for statutory meaning.” 112
D. Recent Scholarship on Remedying the Chevron Fiction
Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Chevron, scholars
began either defending Chevron’s premise or suggesting ways the
doctrine should be changed to remedy its apparent legal fiction.
Recent scholarship has largely followed similar lines. But these
solutions fall short.
Professor Bressman, for instance, has called for courts to inquire
whether the statute falls into one of three categories and to weigh
several factors in determining whether Congress likely intended to
delegate interpretive authority to an agency. 113 In other words, like
this Note’s proposal, Bressman’s focus is in finding whether
Congress actually intended to delegate rather than assuming such
intent by virtue of ambiguity. To do this, she identifies three signals
that suggest congressional intent to delegate.
First, Congress is more likely to delegate primary interpretive
authority to agencies, and thus courts should defer, when the issue is

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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complex. 114 These statutes would include technical issues “requiring
both time and expertise. If the statutory provision later to be
interpreted concerns a technical matter, requiring the acquisition or
assessment of specialized information, it is likely the sort of subject
that generalist staffers or legislators are unwilling or unable to
handle, even with the benefit of outside consultants.” 115
Second, courts should defer to agency interpretations when the
issue is one where Congress wished to “short-circuit extended
legislative battles over contentious issues.” 116 “A contentious issue is
one subject to active debate between legislative coalitions, the
resolution of which in the statute for either side might derail the
law’s passage.” 117 As such, Congress likely delegated broad issues to
an agency’s discretion when the issue was so contentious that neither
side could muster a majority. 118
Third, Congress is likely to delegate primary interpretive
authority when there are adequate procedures in place to “ensure
that subsequent agency interpretations will roughly track legislative
preferences. It can use procedures for that purpose or rely on
positions that the agency has maintained before or taken during the
course of legislative drafting.” 119
Consistent with her critiques of Chevron’s failures, Professor
Bressman stresses that courts should not focus on a search for
specific meaning using any of the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation. 120 According to Bressman, political scientists and legal
scholars have shown that often Congress does not intend a single
meaning. 121 She argues that textualism “seems to transform statutory
interpretation into a kind of exercise in judicial ingenuity. The
textualist judge treats questions of interpretation like a puzzle to

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 576–77.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 578–79.
Id.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 559–67.
Id.
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which it is assumed there is one right answer.” 122 She continues that
“intentionalism and purposivism are still vulnerable to judicial craft
because they also ask courts to construct a meaning for statutory text
on the assumption that the text has one right answer.” 123 If Congress
did not intend only one particular meaning, then Chevron’s laser
focus on the search for a text’s meaning does nothing to help
determine whether Congress meant to delegate primary interpretive
authority to agencies.
Consequently, if Congress had no particular intent regarding the
issue before the court—the argument goes—the court should stop
looking for it. This lack of intent could occur because Congress
could not reach a consensus and therefore inserted vague language
for agencies to flesh out. 124 It could also occur because the subject
area was overly technical, so Congress gave agencies sweeping
discretion to transform statutory guidelines into policy outcomes. 125
Bressman’s arguments for how the Court should address
Chevron’s errors are incomplete, and to the extent they are
incomplete, they are unpersuasive for at least three reasons. First, the
notion that Congress always wishes to delegate interpretive authority
to an agency when the subject matter is technical or when Congress
inserts unclear language to break a legislative logjam remains as
much a legal fiction as the one Chevron promotes.
Always delegating to agencies when issues are either technical or
require compromise between legislative factions creates the same
type of legal fiction decried in Chevron; namely, the doctrine
purports to but does not actually correlate with legislative
expectations. For instance, in Bressman’s later work with Professor
Gluck, legislative drafters reported that they try to write clear
statutes when they have a singular meaning in mind and when they
do not want agencies to diverge from that meaning. 126 “The

122. Id. at 564 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994)).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 553 (Congress “likely delegates to avoid contentious issues and obtain
consensus on legislation”).
125. Id. (Congress “likely delegates to avoid complex issues, which conserves legislative
resources and capitalizes on agency expertise”).
126. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 996.
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presumption is broad deference, so we try to be clear when we want
otherwise.” 127 Thus, if a court finds that the text is clear but
nonetheless defers to the agency because the statutory material is
complex and technical, the court would subvert congressional intent.
Second, even when Congress may not have intended one aspect
of a particular provision to carry a singular meaning, it does not
follow that Congress did not intend to convey a singular meaning in
other provisions or the statute as a whole. For instance, Congress
may draw up a statute with technical portions but provide other
provisions that dictate the limits of how an agency may interpret and
implement those technical provisions. In this way, Professor
Bressman’s argument would lead courts to repeat Chevron’s failures,
for, as one scholar has remarked, “The danger of Chevron is that it
invites courts to ignore the fact that Congress decided some things
because it did not decide everything.” 128
And, even if the issue before Congress was contentious and
included “active debate between legislative coalitions”—which
courts could determine only by “look[ing] to the surrounding
circumstances”—it does not follow that the disagreement resulted in
ambiguous language, with “each side decid[ing] to take their
chances with the scheme devised by the agency.” 129 The result could
have just as plausibly been a horse-trading compromise, resulting in
each side receiving certain specific, advantageous components of the
whole. If an agency interpreted the statute as only one legislative
coalition wished, courts would again subvert congressional intent by
allowing one coalition to have its cake and eat it too.
Courts should therefore consider more than complexity and the
circumstances surrounding the statute’s passage when determining if
an agency’s interpretation warrants deference. This is especially so
since Bressman has noted that under her approach, a court would
infrequently “conclude that a regulatory issue is not so complex as to
suggest delegation.” 130 But despite a statute’s complexity, Congress is
capable of creating provisions with specific and singular meaning.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Herz, supra note 1, at 220.
Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 578–79 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 577.
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Congress may, and likely does, tend to grant agencies more authority
in technical statutes to interpret provisions and to fill in the details of
certain complex policy issues. This does not mean that the entire
statute lacks for specific meaning. Thus, the fact that a particular
provision brims with complexity does not alone give reason to
delegate. There must be further textual clues that Congress likely
gave an agency interpretive authority over a particular issue.
Third, the text of some statutes may bear only one meaning,
regardless of Congress’s possible intentions to muddle the issue.
While the legal fiction that Professor Bressman proposes may
correctly predict that Congress is more likely to delegate under
certain circumstances, her solution is at least incomplete and thus
inadequate to approximate when Congress is likely to intend to
delegate primary interpretive authority to an agency.
Thus, the Chevron doctrine rests on a legal fiction that courts
and scholars have failed to remedy. Granted, Congress probably
intends administrative deference in a wide array of statutory
provisions. It is likely that Congress often means to grant agencies
broad authority to do as they see best, within vaguely delineated
guidelines. But often a statutory text results in ambiguity, and there
is no evidence that Congress meant the ambiguity as any type of
signal. More likely, the ambiguity was unintentional. In these
circumstances, courts should distinguish between two concepts—
ambiguity and vagueness—concepts that courts have often conflated.
II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TYPES OF
STATUTORY UNCERTAINTY
When a court determines that a statutory provision is unclear,
the Chevron doctrine insists on deference to the agency’s
interpretation, if the interpretation is reasonable. But not every
unclear statute suffers from the same malady. Yet, when reviewing
agency interpretations of statutes, courts treat different types of
uncertainty in statutory language as if they were equivalent. The
Chevron opinion lumps all uncertainty into two categories: either the
statute is silent on the issue or the text is ambiguous. If the provision
falls into either of these categories, the question becomes “whether
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the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” 131 The Supreme Court consistently identifies all types of
unclear statutory language as “ambiguous.” 132 And, likely because
the Supreme Court has never differentiated between ambiguity and
vagueness, lower courts have also failed to do so.
The problem, ironically, is that the word ambiguous is itself
lexically ambiguous—that is, ambiguous has multiple meanings.
Courts have used the term to refer to all uncertainty in written text,
and thus when the Supreme Court directs lower courts to defer to
agencies in the face of ambiguity, that includes all instances in which
the meaning is unclear—in essence, whenever the question of
statutory interpretation is difficult. But this Note uses the words
ambiguity and ambiguous more technically and encourages courts to
distinguish between different types of textual uncertainty.
Consider the distinctness of two conceptually different cases that
have come before the Court in the recent past. Most recently, the
Court decided City of Arlington v. FCC, which involved the proper
interpretation of a Communications Act provision requiring
governments to act on applications “within a reasonable period of
time after the request is duly filed.” 133 While the question before the
Supreme Court implicated subtler questions of jurisdiction, the
Court held that it owed deference to the FCC’s interpretation of the
provision since the agency determined that a reasonable time meant
ninety days. 134 Justice Scalia reasoned that the decision rested on a
presumed congressional intent; “namely, ‘that Congress, when it left
ambiguity in a statute’ administered by an agency, ‘understood that
the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency,
and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.’” 135 The Court thought it

131. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
132. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 310 (2013) (describing a vague
statutory language as “open ended—i.e. ‘ambiguous’”).
133. Id. at 290 (emphasis added) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2012)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 296 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–
41 (1996)).
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proper to let the agency determine what time period fell under the
term reasonable. 136
Alternatively, in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline,
the Court was called on to determine the correct interpretation of
the term age in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). 137 The Court acknowledged that the ADEA “forbids
discriminatory preference for the young over the old” but needed to
decide “whether it prohibits favoring the old over the young.” 138 In
General Dynamics, a group of workers claimed “reverse age
discrimination” before the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), and the agency agreed that the clause
“because of [an] individual’s age” also included favoring the old over
the young. 139 This case was a pure question of statutory
interpretation, distinguishing between two plausible meanings of
age—one denoting old age and the alternative suggesting
chronological age.
Despite the difference between the provisions in the two cases,
the Court analyzed the two under the same framework: the
principles set out in Chevron. 140 In the first instance, it is farcical that
the Court could determine the singular meaning of a “reasonable
period of time,” and therefore it is sensible to defer to an agency’s
interpretation of the statute. By contrast, it is highly unlikely that
Congress delegated to the EEOC the responsibility of determining
whether the ADEA prohibited only traditional age discrimination
(favoring the young over the old) or whether it prohibited all age
discrimination. This is partly because the word age, while having two
distinct senses, is capable of one singular meaning depending on the
context. Congress could not have meant old age and chronological
age concurrently, and therefore the provision had only one correct
interpretation. The Court was essentially deciding which of the two
meanings of door or bank Congress intended.
136. Id.
137. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
138. Id. at 584.
139. Id. at 585 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012)).
140. Id. While it is true that the Court in General Dynamics did not ultimately apply
Chevron because it found the statutory text to be clear, the Court nonetheless analyzed the
cases under the Chevron two-step framework—rejecting Chevron deference at step one.
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The Court would have been justified in rejecting Chevron
deference in General Dynamics on the ground that the clause
“because of [an] individual’s age,” 141 though lexically ambiguous, has
only a single meaning. It is simply impossible for the provision to
protect only the old from discrimination while simultaneously
protecting anyone regardless of age.
Courts should distinguish between these two types of statutory
uncertainty because failing to do so perpetuates the notion that
Chevron rests upon a misguided fiction. Indeed, Congress does not
always intend to delegate primary interpretive authority to agencies
when the text is unclear. To more clearly understand when Congress
is likely to delegate this authority to agencies and when it is less
likely, it is helpful to understand the distinction between ambiguity
and vagueness and the facets of each.
A. Vagueness
When the Court in Chevron described the statutory language as
“ambiguous,” it should have characterized the lack of clarity as
vagueness. But the Court’s incorrect description of the statutory
terms does not come as a surprise because the two terms are often
conflated and most people likely think first of vague terms when
hearing that a statute is “ambiguous.” When a statutory provision is
ambiguous, a disputed word or phrase has multiple distinct
definitions (lexical ambiguity), or the structure of the sentence leaves
the reader unclear as to how to interpret the provision
(syntactic ambiguity).
In contrast, a vague statute is one in which the issue is whether
the actions of one party fall within the meaning of a particular
term. 142 Some vague words, for instance deictic words, 143 offer little
specificity and change their significance depending on the
circumstance. What is “tall” in one circumstance may be quite

141. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
142. Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary defines the term as “not having
a precise meaning” and “not sharply outlined.” Vague, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://
www. merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vague (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).
143. Examples of deictic words are this, that, me, and here, which change their
significance depending on the context, such as the location or identify of the speaker.
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different depending on the referent, whether the person is a child or
a basketball player. An extremely tall child would be categorized as
tiny for an NBA player. A “reasonable” time to wait would change
significantly depending if the person were in a doctor’s office waiting
room, measured in minutes or hours, or expecting a package to
arrive after an online order, measured in days or weeks. It is not that
words like tall and reasonable do not convey meaning. Each certainly
expresses a concrete idea, but that idea often conveys a range whose
exact boundaries are blurred. These examples are clearly vague, and
it is highly likely that courts would defer to agencies on these types
of questions even in the absence of a formal Chevron doctrine.
Other types of vague terms are not so obviously indefinite, but
the same principle applies. When a court must determine whether a
particular object is excluded from the park as a “vehicle,” there are
an innumerable number of objects that are obviously not vehicles.
That is, the word vehicle is not completely indefinite: it conveys a
relatively bounded meaning. But there are dozens of modes of
transportation that might or might not be “vehicles” as expressed in
the statute, depending on how broadly the court construes the term.
To construe a vague term like vehicle, the court would be required to
determine the core characteristics of a vehicle and to determine
whether the alleged object shares enough of those characteristics to
be considered a vehicle. This is a significantly different analysis from
determining which of two distinct senses of bank operates in a
specific statutory provision.
Vague terms are “united as non-distinguished subcases of a
single, more general meaning.” 144 In other words, the term is
characterized by the existence of borderline cases that do not clearly
fall into the definition. As an illustration, the colors red and orange
have recognized significance, meaning each has a core color. Nearly
everyone would agree that a carrot is orange and a ripe strawberry is
red. However, there are an infinite number of shades between these
two colors. Since the line between where red ends and orange begins
is fuzzy, likely evincing many opinions, these colors are vague. This is
not to say that red and orange are meaningless terms or that no color
144. David Tuggy, Ambiguity, Polysemy, and Vagueness, 4 COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 273,
273 (1993).

694

3.Hoopes.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete)

663

1/10/2018 4:01 PM

Chevron’s Pure Questions

shade fits nicely within one categorization. But because there are
clearly borderline cases, the color concepts themselves are
somewhat vague.
A recent, fairly run-of-the-mill case illustrates a vague term. In
Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, the Court had to
determine whether stormwater runoff from logging roads was
“associated with industrial activity.” 145 The Clean Water Act (CWA)
requires potential polluters to secure permits before “pollutants are
discharged into waters of the United States.” 146 The CWA makes an
exception for “discharges composed entirely of stormwater” 147 unless
the pollutant is “associated with industrial activity.” 148
While industrial activity is far from the vaguest term courts
encounter, it remains true that the term is unclear. The manner in
which the term is used has one general meaning, with both parties
conceding that industrial activity relates to manufacturing or a
similar activity. But there exist fringe cases in which one
understanding of industrial activity might include logging activity
and another understanding might exclude it. In such cases, the
correct interpretation is more a matter of policymaking than textual
interpretation. The surrounding text or other provisions might give
more context and guidance, but the term itself yields little clarity.
The phrase industrial activity is similar to the term vehicle, in
that it is difficult to definitively say that a bicycle, for example, is a
vehicle. Bicycles share many characteristics with automobiles, likely
the quintessential vehicle, but they also have many differing
characteristics. Similarly, logging shares many characteristics
with more quintessential industrial activities, like automobile
manufacturing, but it also differs quite significantly. The term
industrial activity, then, is vague, and the Court was correct in
deferring to the agency. Purporting to interpret the term would be
little more than judicial policymaking.

145. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
146. Id. at 1331 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1) (2012) (substantially similar to the
current 2017 version of the regulation)).
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(1) (2012).
148. Id. § 1342(p)(2)(B).
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Another example comes from the Chevron opinion itself. The
Clean Air Act (CAA) imposes additional requirements on states that
have not met the standards set by the EPA. 149 One of these
requirements is to establish a permit program regulating “new or
modified major stationary sources.” 150 The litigation arose over the
proper interpretation of the term stationary source. 151 One side read
the term to refer to each physical structure that emitted pollution,
and the other party interpreted it as referring to a “bubble” of
several “pollution-emitting devices” within a single industrial
plant. 152 The phrase stationary source, left undefined by Congress,
does not seem to give any guidance on the term. Congress
understood that the EPA would likely promulgate regulations about
what qualified as a major stationary source of pollution and did not
deem it necessary to give clearer instructions.
B. Ambiguity
The two types of ambiguity are lexical and syntactic, and they
both share similar properties. Ambiguity generally arises when a
word or phrase has two or more plausible meanings and the context
does not immediately make clear which meaning is intended. Most
words in the English language have more than one meaning, 153 and
this creates ambiguity when the writer or speaker is not careful.
1. Lexical ambiguity
Lexical ambiguity is demonstrated by a popular joke:
Tourist: What a lovely color that cow is!
Farmer: It’s a Jersey.
Tourist: Oh, I thought it was its skin. 154

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
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The confusion—and humor—is derived from the two distinct
meanings of jersey. As with bank, the word jersey has two distinct
meanings that may cause confusion—one referencing a sports jersey
and one referring to a breed of cow. But just because the word has
more than a single sense does not mean that both the tourist and the
farmer did not intend to convey a specific meaning. The farmer did
not use the term jersey to refer to sports apparel just because the
word has two plausible meanings. In a similar manner, an agency
faced with an analogous question should not receive deference just
because the word or phrase it purports to interpret has two
plausible meanings.
One way of understanding the issue of lexical ambiguity is to
look at the debate among linguists about how word meanings are
defined. 155 Some linguists contend that words with numerous
meanings have multiple senses. 156 The words are the same, but the
word bank has two distinct senses, a riverbank and a financial
institution. Other linguists counter that these two meanings are
actually different words that happen to have the same spelling. 157
This argument is easier to make with very distinct meanings, as with
bank, and less persuasive with closely related meanings, as with door.
Yet, one way to conceptualize how courts would identify lexical
ambiguity is to view the two senses of door as separate words even
though English speakers spell the words the same and often do not
recognize the distinction until it is brought to their attention. 158
Consider a difficult case, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.159
Saint Clair Adams signed an employment contract with his employer,
Circuit City Stores, that required all claims against the company be
brought to arbitration. 160 The Federal Arbitration Act directs that
these contractual arbitration clauses be enforced unless the contract

155. See, e.g., Gillon, supra note 21, at 391–401; Adam Kilgarriff, “I Don’t Believe in
Word Senses,” 31 COMPUTERS & HUMAN. 91 (1997).
156. See Gillon, supra note 21, at 391–401.
157. See Kilgarriff, supra note 155, at 91.
158. See AITCHISON, supra note 23, at 253–55.
159. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
160. Id.
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is one “of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 161
The statute is clearly ambiguous because the phrase “foreign or
interstate commerce” could have two distinct meanings. 162 The
clause could refer only to contracts of employees working in the
transportation industry. This specific inclusion of “seamen” and
“railroad employees” suggests such an interpretation. However,
Congress also may have intended to include—in “any other class of
workers”—any employee whose contract Congress could regulate
under the Commerce Clause. Given the Supreme Court’s nearly
boundless reading of the Commerce Clause, an employment
contract with Circuit City would undoubtedly qualify. As one
scholar has remarked, “Who is right? As a linguistic matter
both understandings are plausible because the statute is
[lexically] ambiguous.” 163
Congress cannot have written a statute that protects employees
solely in the transportation industry and simultaneously protects any
worker whose contract could be regulated. The latter category
necessarily encompasses the former, thereby rendering void the
statute’s exclusive function. Congress must have had one of the two
meanings in mind. While the Circuit City case exemplifies a finer
grained ambiguity than bank, the same principle holds true. Just as a
court deciding between a statute that potentially regulates financial
banks or riverbanks, courts should not defer to an administrative
agency in cases of lexical ambiguity because the statutory provision
permits a singular meaning.

161. Id. at 112 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (substantially similar to the current 2012
version of the statute)).
162. See Lawrence M. Solan, Linguistic Issues in Statutory Interpretation, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 87 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan
eds., 2012).
163. Id.

698

3.Hoopes.FIN.no headers.docx (Do Not Delete)

663

1/10/2018 4:01 PM

Chevron’s Pure Questions

2. Syntactic ambiguity
Another type of ambiguity is syntactic or grammatical ambiguity,
in which uncertainty arises from the grammatical structure of the
sentence. Groucho Marx humorously remarked, “This morning I
shot an elephant in my pajamas. How he got in my pajamas I don’t
know.” 164 The first sentence is syntactically ambiguous because, based
on the structure of the sentence, it could convey that either Groucho
or the elephant wore the pajamas. 165 The most common syntactic
ambiguity in statutes occurs when an adjective or adverb appears in a
list but the text is unclear whether the descriptor modifies each item
in the list or merely the adjacent item.
The classic case of syntactic ambiguity is Liparota v. United
States. 166 In Liparota, the prosecution proved that a man had
purchased food stamps from an undercover Department of
Agriculture agent for significantly less than face value. 167 The statute
the prosecution relied upon read that “whoever knowingly uses,
transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards
in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations” is
criminally liable. 168 The government argued that “knowingly” did
not modify all parts of the clause, and thus the prosecution had to
prove only that the individual knew that he possessed (illegal) food
stamps. 169 Alternatively, the defendant pressed for a different reading,
arguing that he had to know that possessing unauthorized food
stamps was illegal. 170 The grammatical structure of the text creates
plausible linguistic interpretations for both sides.
Another example comes from a jury instruction providing that a
person may be convicted of conspiracy if the individual “was aware
of the common purpose, had knowledge that the conspiracy existed,
or was aware of the conspiracy from its beginning.” 171 The D.C.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

DEBRA AARONS, JOKES AND THE LINGUISTIC MIND 131 (2012).
Id.
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
Id. at 421–23.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 423.
Id.
United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
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Circuit found syntactic ambiguity in the instruction because it was
not entirely clear whether “from its beginning” modified all three
clauses or simply the final one. 172 The structure of the sentence
obscured the relationship between the clauses and created
uncertainty regarding the correct interpretation.
When either type of ambiguity, lexical and syntactic, occurs in a
statute, there exist at least two plausible interpretations. Once a
court determines which meaning is correct, however, all other
meanings are necessarily deemed incorrect and the analysis is
complete. With lexical ambiguity, for instance, a word might have
several recognized senses, but each sense has a reasonably bounded
meaning. Once the court has disposed of the legal question by
determining the correct interpretation, the only remaining issues are
questions of fact regarding whether the particular situation falls into
the category defined by the word sense.
Thus, not all unclear statutory provisions are cut from the same
cloth. Simply because a statute is not straightforward and clear,
courts should not automatically assume that Congress left the
question open for an agency to determine. Some provisions are
tremendously ambiguous, but if a court is merely deciding which of
two or more meanings of a word applies, it should not defer. As
demonstrated in the following Part, Congress is unlikely to
have intended administrative deference when it drafts, often
unintentionally, statutes that contain lexical or syntactic ambiguities.
III. JUSTIFYING THE AMBIGUITY EXCEPTION
In distinguishing between ambiguous and vague statutory
provisions, courts would not alter their analysis as much as it might
seem. This Note encourages courts to determine whether Congress
intended a specific meaning for a given provision, which, if so, courts
are then obligated to enforce. The change in the Chevron doctrine
would be in how the court determines whether Congress provided an
answer to statutory uncertainty: instead of analyzing the clarity of
the provision, courts ought to analyze whether the provision, as
172. Id. at 1510 (noting that the jurors could have “resolve[d] the syntactic ambiguity
in the disputed sentence by concluding that ‘in the beginning’ modifies only the last and not
the first two verb phrases”).
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written, has one specific meaning or whether Congress merely set
out guidelines, even if fairly specific ones. This forms the basis of the
distinction between ambiguous and vague provisions, respectively.
When a provision has one specific meaning (ambiguity), the court
would choose which definition of a multi-sense word applies—that
is, it would simply resolve a question of pure statutory construction.
The current Chevron doctrine encompasses one part of the
analysis: if the provision is clear, the court infers that there is a
singular meaning that courts may deduce from the statute’s
language. 173 But courts are missing a key element: many statutes are
genuinely ambiguous but nonetheless capable of no more than one
plausible meaning, such as age discrimination. This is not to say that
the words themselves have only one singular definition (bank has at
least two), but that the provision cannot bear both meanings
simultaneously. A provision relating to banks cannot plausibly
simultaneously regulate both financial institutions and waterways.
(By contrast, a vague provision relating to vehicles in the park could
plausibly regulate both cars and motorcycles.) Courts, as opposed to
agencies, ought to be the primary interpreters of these
ambiguous provisions.
A. Deference for Ambiguity Does Not Square with
Congressional Intent
Courts should not defer when faced with ambiguous provisions
because the reasons the Supreme Court has provided for
administrative deference do not apply to ambiguous provisions. As
already noted, Professors Gluck and Bressman’s study concluded that
ambiguity in statutes does not automatically indicate Congress’s
intention to delegate to an agency. 174 Congressional drafters noted
that “although ambiguity sometimes signals intent to delegate, often
it does not.” 175 If the lack of clarity does not always signify
Congress’s objective that agencies assume primary interpretive

173. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984).
174. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 996; see also supra notes 101–03 and
accompanying text.
175. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 996.
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responsibilities, which imprecise provisions does Congress intend
courts to interpret without agency deference?
This Part contends that lexical and syntactic ambiguities are the
best candidates for judicial interpretation. Congress is unlikely to
intend that primary interpretive authority rests with an agency in the
face of lexical or syntactic ambiguity for two reasons. First, statutory
ambiguity is often unintentional, and, second, an incorrect decision
regarding which definition operates results in a fundamental change
to the statute rather than a decision regarding the statute’s
applicability to the pertinent issue.
Lexical and syntactic ambiguities are most often unintentional.
The Gluck and Bressman study confirms that Congress often tries to
be clear and specific, 176 but despite its best efforts, ambiguities in
statutes remain. This is because ambiguities are sometimes difficult
to identify, especially for the one drafting the statute. Since the girl
saying, “I saw a man with a telescope” knows she was looking
through her own telescope, it is probable she would not recognize
the possibility that a listener might think she spotted a man holding
his telescope. 177
Indeed, researchers have concluded that when a person confronts
an ambiguous text, with one word or phrase having multiple
meanings, the subconscious mind weighs the different meanings and
determines the most likely. 178 The brain has the capacity to
subconsciously consider multiple meanings without alerting the
conscious brain to the fact that an ambiguity exists. 179 In other
words, many people who are presented with ambiguous sentences
seem to understand the sentence without ever noticing the
ambiguity. 180 If native speakers of a language often do not
consciously recognize the potential ambiguity in sentences, this
176. Id. (“The presumption is broad deference, so we try to be clear when we
want otherwise.”).
177. See FROMKIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 176–77. The professors use and diagram the
sentence “The boy saw the man with a telescope” and explain that “[i]t is ambiguous because
it can mean that the boy saw the man by using a telescope or that the boy saw the man who
was holding a telescope. The sentence is structurally ambiguous because it is associated with
two different phrase structures, each corresponding to a different meaning.” Id.
178. AITCHISON, supra note 23, at 253–55 (summarizing the results of several studies).
179. Id.
180. Id.
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would not allow congressional drafters to weigh how another person
would likely interpret the provision.
It follows that if there is no congressional recognition of an
ambiguity, there can be no congressional intent to establish an
ambiguity. Unless Congress has a meta-intent that agencies should
be the primary interpreters of all ambiguities, it cannot possibly
intend an unrecognized ambiguity to signal anything to agencies or
courts. This is simply because there cannot be intent where there is
no recognition. Thus, courts cannot infer that Congress intends all
unrecognized ambiguities to signal deference because, as scholars
have concluded, Congress does not possess a meta-intent that all
ambiguities be resolved at the agency level. 181
Although Congress likely does not recognize many statutory
ambiguities, this does not signal that Congress does not intend to
ascribe a specific meaning to the provisions. Ambiguous words or
phrases have one singular meaning in the sense that they cannot bear
more than one meaning at a time, and therefore members of
Congress must have thought the provision meant one of multiple
meanings. The provision possessed a finite meaning when drafted,
and by not recognizing an alternative interpretation, Congress could
not have shown an actual intent for that ambiguity to be resolved by
a specific entity—agency or court. 182
Further, when interpreting lexical and syntactic ambiguities,
courts and agencies do more than merely fill in the details. They
fundamentally characterize the nature of the statute. It is true that
interpreting some—perhaps even the vast majority of—ambiguities
will not completely alter the entire statutory scheme, but each
ambiguity defines the statute in a manner such that if a court or

181. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 93, at 996.
182. The reasoning stands true regardless of whether one believes that the language itself
possesses a finite meaning or whether one believes that Congress had a finite meaning in mind
when it drafted the statute (in other words, whether one is a textualist or intentionalist). When
a statute cannot regulate two situations simultaneously—such as traditional age discrimination
or reverse age discrimination—the provision must have one singular meaning. In other words,
the textual language must be interpreted in one single manner to be consistent (the statute
cannot regulate both), and Congress was highly unlikely to have intended both meanings—
each founded in distinct policy considerations—because such a provision would essentially be
leaving the statute’s most fundamental feature for an agency to determine.
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agency interprets it incorrectly, it directly contradicts the meaning
the provision originally bore.
For instance, returning to the example of General Dynamics,
Congress passed the ADEA, which prohibited discrimination
“because of [an] individual’s age.” 183 This statute proved an instance
of genuine ambiguity, and both the majority and dissent had
convincing arguments regarding which interpretation was proper.
Thus, the current Chevron doctrine would instruct the court to defer
to the EEOC’s interpretation. However, it is highly unlikely that
members of Congress did not understand whether the statute
protected solely against discrimination against the elderly or
protected against reverse discrimination. If an agency or court
interpreted the ambiguity in a way that Congress did not intend, the
result would go beyond simply filling in details—it would directly
contradict the statutory meaning.
This analysis does not apply to vague provisions, however,
because vague words and phrases, in the strict sense, have indefinite
meanings. This leads to less certainty that Congress ever considered
the question presented to the court. As with Professor Hart’s
hypothetical, even if the hypothetical legislative body could agree on
a core purpose for prohibiting vehicles in the park, individual
members would likely disagree on an exhaustive list of prohibited
vehicles. This is also illustrated by Decker. 184 Industrial activity has a
core significance, meaning that members of Congress could surely
agree on many activities that would not qualify. But, it is also highly
probable that if each member of Congress attempted to provide an
exhaustive list of applicable activities, each of the 535 lists would
differ, many in significant ways. If Congress paused to consider the
term, it would recognize the need for someone down the line to add
substance to the concept. Congress would also likely recognize that
as new industries emerge with new technologies, some governmental

183. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586 (2004) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (substantially similar to the current 2012 version of the statute)).
184. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1326 (2013).
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entity will need to determine the statute’s applicability to an industry
to which Congress could not have had a specific intent. 185
Consequently, ambiguous provisions are distinct from vague
provisions, and congressional intent likely differs with respect to
each. Deferring to an agency to interpret a lexically or syntactically
ambiguous provision would potentially allow that agency to change
the effect of a statute when Congress did not even recognize the
existence of an ambiguity in the first instance.
B. Deference for Ambiguity Is Not Supported by Alternative Theories
Congressional intent to delegate primary interpretive authority
to agencies for unclear statutes is not the only rationale for
administrative deference. Scholars have contended that policy
considerations also suggest that courts ought to defer. 186 The most
persuasive of these rationales are expertise and accountability. First,
agencies have the necessary expertise courts lack to understand how
to implement congressional statutes. 187 Second, executive agencies
are more politically accountable than unelected, lifetime-tenured
judges. 188 For these reasons, scholars contend, courts should defer to
agencies when a statute is unclear. 189 As this section argues, agency
expertise and accountability do not apply with the same force, and
are in fact rather weak justifications, when applied to courts’
interpreting lexical and syntactic ambiguities. But before elaborating
on this position, it is worth explaining how these two rationales
apply with compelling force to interpreting vague provisions.
Chevron deference is appropriate in instances of vagueness
because vague terms possess no singular, definite meaning, leaving
whichever institution that interprets the statute to act in the role of
policymaker. Chevron instructs courts, during step one, to use the

185. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9–10
(1994) (“Over time, the gaps and ambiguities proliferate as society changes, adapts to the
statute, and generates new variations on the problem initially targeted by the statute.”).
186. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 421 (2013) [hereinafter Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain].
187. Id. at 423.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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traditional theories of statutory interpretation to determine “[i]f the
intent of Congress is clear.” 190 This step, in essence, is a search for
meaning. Depending on their preferred theory of statutory
interpretation, judges approach this step differently. Intentionalist or
purposivist judges attempt to find the legislative purpose behind the
statute. These judges argue that courts ought to find meaning based
on the legislative purpose because “[l]imits on human foresight,
imprecision in the tools of linguistic expression, and constraints on
legislative resources contribute to the production of generally
worded texts that could not possibly capture the variety of situations
that lie ahead.” 191 Thus, they conclude, since the words do not
necessarily guide a judge to the correct answer, a court should resort
to interpreting the words in light “of policies that serve some
overarching purpose.” 192 Despite a court’s attempt to find the
general—and some would say abstract—purpose, the purposivist
remains intent on “construct[ing] a meaning for statutory text on
the assumption that the text has one right answer.” 193
Textualist judges approach the problem from a distinct
perspective “in part because they hold different pictures about
legislative behavior.” 194 They believe that ambiguity arises because
“legislators cut deals to obtain consensus, and awkward words reflect
those deals.” 195 Thus, to give effect to those legislative deals,
“[m]odern textualists adhere to the ordinary meaning of those
words to give effect to whatever deal they may manifest.” 196 In doing
this, these judges seek to find the statute’s one singular meaning,
confident that a careful analysis of the text will reveal the
correct interpretation.
Chevron, then, is likely the result of the recognition that both
these theories of interpretation are not wholly effective in every

190.
191.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2010 (2006) (describing Justice Stevens’s theory of
statutory interpretation).
192. Id.
193. Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 564.
194. Id. at 559.
195. Id. at 560.
196. Id.
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circumstance. Judge Laurence Silberman once wrote that Chevron
was created because, even when “one is scrupulously honest in
reading a statute thoroughly and looking carefully at its linguistic
structure,” statutory provisions often are genuinely ambiguous,
“giv[ing] room for differing good-faith interpretations.” 197 In other
words, when a statute does not make clear that Congress intended a
specific meaning, Chevron should apply to ensure the “avoidance of
judicial policy making” because “the executive[] has a greater claim
to make policy choices than the judiciary.” 198 No judge, no matter
how intelligent or ingenious, can find a singular meaning where
none exists. To quote Gertrude Stein, no matter how carefully one
scrutinizes the text or legislative history of some statutory provisions,
“there is no there there.” 199
When judges interpret a vague statute to have a specific meaning
when there is none, they are effectively engaging in policymaking.
This is clearly inconsistent with the founders’ view of the judiciary as
the “least dangerous” branch. 200 For this reason, Judge Silberman
wrote that the Chevron doctrine, in certain circumstances, “more
appropriately than any other [doctrine], serves to distinguish those
who advocate judicial restraint, who stand, if you will, for a little
judiciary, from those who hold a countervailing view.” 201
But these arguments do not apply with equal force to statutory
provisions that are either lexically or syntactically ambiguous.
Indeed, when a court encounters a genuine ambiguity, no matter
how difficult, and that ambiguity has a singular meaning, the
judiciary has a greater claim to interpretation than the executive
branch. The usual responses of superior agency expertise or greater
democratic accountability fall short.
Supported by the Chevron opinion itself, scholars have long
contended that agencies ought to resolve questions of statutory
interpretation because agencies possess “greater ‘expertise’ than
197. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 821, 826 (1990).
198. Id. at 822.
199. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (Vintage Books
1973) (1937).
200. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Glazier & Co. ed., 1826).
201. Silberman, supra note 197, at 821–22.
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courts in figuring out instrumental applications.” 202 One reason that
agencies may enjoy more expertise in the subject area than courts is
that agencies are specialized. 203 “[A]gency officials spend their time
focusing on a particular set of problems, . . . they have thought
about them more, they have seen what works and what does not
work, and they are sharply aware of the practical trade-offs that are
needed given the scarce resources for implementation.” 204
Another rationale for courts to defer to administrative agencies is
increased political accountability. As noted, Chevron reasoned that
“[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy choices.” 205 Indeed,
as Judge Easterbrook has observed, there is a difference between
Article III judges and agency officers. 206 “The difference is tenure.
When judges make policy . . . you can’t get rid of them. In a
representative democracy, that is a powerful reason not to allow
judges to make policy in the first place.” 207 He continues that these
reasons are “especially true in a nation such as ours whose political
system is designed to make it very hard to enact legislation that
changes judicial decisions.” 208
These prudential arguments make it apparent that courts need to
determine whether the statute has a discernable meaning because
agencies should have primary interpretive authority when the statute
is vague, so long as that interpretation is permissible. But when the
statutory provision contains lexical or syntactic ambiguities, an
agency’s subject-matter expertise and political accountability are no
longer relevant.
While agencies may understand the practical tradeoffs of various
alternatives or prove more politically discerning, courts are experts in
interpreting the law. Judges have more experience in parsing legal

202. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain, supra note 186, at 421.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
206. Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L.
REV. 1 (2004).
207. Id. at 9.
208. Id.
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texts than do agency officials, as judges perform these functions on a
daily basis. District court judges defer to the judgments of juries in
fact questions and appellate judges give deference for the same to
trial court findings. But neither defers to any other when analyzing
questions of law, especially statutory interpretation, because judges
are the presumed experts in this field.
Additionally, judges are not under the same political pressures as
agency officials and are in a better position to find the correct textual
meaning of the statute rather than to use the text as a means to
an end. Indeed, as one scholar has noted, many “[s]ensitive
questions of agency statutory interpretation” are decided
by “political appointees . . . rather than agency specialists.” 209 Even
when “experts” determine the meaning of a statute, critics have long
contended that “‘expertise’ cannot be exercised objectively and
instead simply masks value-laden policy decisions.” 210
Professor Eskridge has also acknowledged that agencies cannot
always be counted on to follow the best reading of the text. 211 He
has noted that “virtually anyone who has had experience in actual
administration agrees that even well-motivated agencies engage in
what economists would call ‘shirking,’ namely, departing from the
(majoritarian) agenda set for the agency by Congress.” 212 Professor
Eskridge has identified two types of “shirking.” 213 First, agencies
shirk their rule of law duties by “press[ing] statutory policy beyond
the established meaning of the statute” because agency officials “get
caught up in the normative bounce that comes from aggressively
pursuing the agency’s mission.” 214 Second, an agency shirks its
democratic duties by “mak[ing] a major policy move on its own,

209. Criddle, supra note 36, at 1287–88.
210. Id. at 1287; see also Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2135 (2002) (“[T]he legal realists’ hope that legal ambiguities
could be resolved by objective policy expertise has long ago grown quaint. . . . In practice, it is
rare to find a field of social policy where there are not experts on opposing sides of an issue . . .
undermining any claim to an objective expert resolution.”); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1683–87 (1975).
211. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain, supra note 186, at 433.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 434.
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without sufficient mooring in a congressional authorization.” 215 In
contrast, judges are disinterested and are not charged with furthering
any agency’s mission; thus, judges are in a better position than are
agency officials to find the meaning of an ambiguous statute when
the statutory provision has a specific meaning.
Agency policy judgments are not necessarily harmful, especially
when exercised in the face of a vague statute, but executive
policymaking has no place when Congress has already made the
decision. This necessarily negates the democratic accountability
rationale because, even setting aside the power-allocating provisions
of the Constitution, Congress holds much greater political
accountability than do agencies. When a statute has a singular
meaning, regardless of whether Congress used ambiguous words or
gave the provision an ambiguous construction, Congress has made
the decision and agencies must follow. No matter how much more
politically accountable agencies are than courts, when Congress
regulates a financial bank by using the word bank, the agency cannot
construe that term to refer to riverbanks, no matter how plausible
the interpretation.
In instances of lexical and syntactic ambiguity, the question no
longer becomes which institution, agency, or court, has thought
more about the policy or practical implications of the statute, as
scholars have suggested. Rather, the question becomes which
institution is best situated to determine the law, to determine the
meaning of provisions that Congress has passed and the president
has signed.
Moreover, courts should not defer to agencies’ interpretations of
lexically and syntactically ambiguous provisions because, under
Chevron, agencies’ interpretations get upheld unless they are
unreasonable, even if they are not the best interpretation of the
statute. This point is crucial because the Chevron doctrine does
analytical work only when the court would have ruled against the
agency but defers instead. A court would have no need of a
deference doctrine if its interpretation is identical to that of the
agency. Courts, then, should not defer to agencies when it appears
that there is one correct answer because the court, without a
215.
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deference doctrine, must pick the best interpretation rather than
simply sanction a plausible one. Returning to the example of General
Dynamics, both interpretations of age—old age and chronological
age—were plausible, but Congress undoubtedly intended only one
of those meanings. 216
If agencies receive administrative deference for questions such as
the one posed in General Dynamics, and an agency interprets a
provision incorrectly despite the preponderance of evidence pointing
toward the opposite answer, then the court would be obligated to
side with the agency’s incorrect interpretation merely because both
interpretations were plausible or permissible. This, however, can be
avoided. Requiring courts to determine the meaning of lexical and
structural ambiguities would increase the likelihood that statutes will
be interpreted as Congress intended.
For vague statutes, on the other hand, agencies are in the best
position to formulate policy because they possess superior expertise
in formulating policy and are more politically accountable than
courts. 217 When the text of the statute has a singular but ambiguous
meaning, however, courts are preferable to agencies in determining
the correct interpretation because courts possess superior expertise in
interpreting texts, and because courts, being disinterested third
parties, are less prone to the political pressure to interpret statutes in
a plausible but incorrect manner. Moreover, creating a Chevron
exception for lexical and syntactic ambiguities will empower
courts to honor congressional intent by freeing them from the
obligation to defer to agencies’ plausible though ultimately
incorrect interpretations.
I acknowledge that distinguishing statutory provisions on
whether they are vague or ambiguous has its downsides. For
instance, lower courts might have difficulty in applying the “pure
questions” doctrine with complete accuracy, as has occurred with

216. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 581 (2004).
217. This is true unless, of course, Congress or the Constitution requires the judicial
branch to determine all questions of statutory interpretation, as has been argued persuasively
by many scholars. Yet, as a matter of pure institutional structure, agencies are better equipped
to answer policy questions because of their greater expertise and political accountability. This is
not true, however, when a court is tasked not with developing policy but determining the
policy that Congress has already established.
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Mead. 218 But, as one distinguished scholar has noted, “no theory
based on legislative intent to delegate will yield a simple rule.
Ultimately, simplicity is not the sole benchmark for evaluating any
interpretive theory. An acceptable theory should reflect a reasonable
balance among the various goals . . . .” 219 In the end, the distinction
proposed here may be partially based on a legal fiction that courts
may not apply with perfect accuracy and consistency. However, the
proposed method will track congressional intent and textual cues
more accurately than the legal fiction upon which Chevron is
currently based—namely, that Congress intends agencies to act as
the primary interpretive authority for virtually all unclear statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fact that implied congressional intent is the basis for Chevron
has significant implications for administrative deference. Namely,
courts cannot simply presume that Congress intends any and all
unclear statutes to signal deference to administrative agencies.
Instead, courts must make an inquiry into whether that
assumption remains true in each particular circumstance.
Consequently, the Chevron framework, from the outset, asks the
wrong question. By requiring courts to care only about whether the
statute is clear, as the current Chevron doctrine demands, it obligates
them to ignore the fact that Congress writes many statutory
provisions that have a specific yet ambiguous meaning even though
Congress would not likely wish those statutes to be interpreted
under the merely permissible construction standard. Thus,
instinctively deferring to an agency in the face of every textual
uncertainty undermines congressional intent. Instead of inquiring
whether the statute is clear, courts should determine whether
Congress intended courts to defer to an agency on the question at
issue, even if doing so is difficult to definitively ascertain in any
particular circumstance.

218. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1446–81 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the
Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003) (showing the difficulty the D.C. Circuit has had
in applying Mead).
219. Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 6, at 557.
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The Chevron doctrine could significantly improve how effectively
it shadows Congress’s wishes, and it could do so if courts decline to
defer to agency interpretations when faced with pure questions of
statutory interpretation. Courts can recognize pure questions by
distinguishing between two types of statutory uncertainty, vagueness
and ambiguity, two concepts the Supreme Court has thus far
conflated. When a court is faced with a lexical or syntactic
ambiguity—meaning that the court must determine which of two or
more meanings of a disputed term or phrase applies—the court
should not defer to the agency. Instead, courts should embrace their
responsibility as experts in interpreting the law because, when a
provision is ambiguous rather than vague, Congress would prefer
courts to follow the best reading of the words it enacted rather than
following an agency’s permissible construction.
Neal A. Hoopes ∗
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